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Today there exists a variety of views on the 
potential for privatization in reducing the costs of 
services historically provided by government. The water 
industry is one such area that is dominated by government 
provision. Privatizing public water utilities has a 
large potential for ultimately reducing government 
involvement in the services provided to society. Its 
potential success depends on a variety of economic, 
political and social factors.
INTRODUCTION
Water utilities in the United States have been 
historically owned and operated in the public domain. 
Presently there are in excess of 19,236 centralized water 
systems in the U.S. of which 71% are publicly owned. 
(Mushkin, 1972) If these systems could be privatized 
there would be a significant reduction in government 
involvement in our country. Further, if the economic 
efficiency of the industry were increased, as suggested 
by advocates of privatization, a significant cost savings 
would be realized by its customers.
The question posed in this paper is, can water 
utilities be effectively privatized? Or will their 
inherent nature towards monopoly simply transform them 
into a private monopoly. If privatizing a water utility 
merely creates another form of monopoly, then its 
potential for successfully reducing the size of 
government and cost for services may be ineffective.
In an effort not to rule out the potential for 
privatizing the water industry, it should be noted that 
other countries have successfully done so. France has
historically had its water needs provided by private 
companies. Today approximately 55% of France's drinking 
water is provided by private enterprise. Even though 
comparative studies are not available on the cost of 
private and public water systems in France, the trend 
towards greater privatization suggests enhanced cost 
effectiveness of the privatized systems. (Hanke and 
Walters, 1987)
With the apparent success France has had in the 
private provision of drinking water supplies and the 
perceived need to reduce the size of our government, the 
potential for privatizing water utilities in our country 
could prove very important with respect to the size of 
government and the potential for greater efficiency 
within the industry. The necessity for water to sustain 
life, makes any program for altering its provision of 
enormous importance economically, politically and 
socially.
The focus of this paper is on the key economic, 
political and social implications involved with the water 
industry. Factors such as the structure of public 
utilities (natural monopolies), nature of goods and 
services (quasi public goods), political intervention and 
many other important economic factors will be viewed in
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light of privatization. The development of the water 
industry will be outlined to pin-point the factors that 
pushed the water industry towards predominantly public 
ownership. And finally this research examines the major 
economic conditions within the industry to see if they 
will facilitate the current privatization models that are 
being offered as a means to enhance the industry's 
overall cost efficiency. Further, privatization in the 





HOW IT SHOULD WORK
Privatization is an attempt at reducing the size of 
government by (1) reducing public expenditures, (2) 
reforming public expenditures and, (3) turning more 
public services over to private enterprise. 
Privatization can be further defined at the local level 
to mean public asset divestiture, private financing of 
infrastructures, and private provision of services.
Privatization programs consist in three major areas: 
"(1) privatization of competitive firms - or, more 
generally, transfer to the private sector of state-owned 
enterprises operating in competitive product markets free 
from substantial market failure; (2) privatization of 
monopolies - transfer to private sector of state-owned 
enterprises with substantial market power, like network 
utilities...; and (3) contracting out of publicly 
financed services, previously performed by public sector 
organizations, to the private sector." (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1991)
Even though widely accepted as a privatization 
function some experts with a more purist view point see
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contracting out as not true privatization because 
government still controls the services being delivered.
In the subsequent review contracting services to private 
firms will be considered as an important aspect of 
privatization.1
Along with the expectations that privatization can 
reduce the cost of publicly provided services, comes a 
somewhat more liberal ideology that sees privatization 
as a means to reassign the decision process of providing 
services from public employees to private individuals.
This process is felt to create a more democratic society.
An important element in privatization is the 
difference in the objectives of a firm between public and 
private ownership. Public owners are not profit seeking 
in their approach to running the firm. Their personal 
agendas may reflect favors to interest groups, patronage 
and maximizing their own social welfare. By contrast 
private ownership attempts to maximize profits. By doing 
so^ private profit motives and social welfare should 
closely align. (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991) This 
assumption is based on a competitive market with the
1 A 1985 survey by the International City Management 
Association (ICMA) showed a wide variety of programs contracted out 
including Library operations (12%), tree trimming (30%), utility 
billing (13%), crime prevention and control (10%), data processing 
(24%), and vehicle towing(78%).
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absence of market power.
Where monopoly power or externalities are present 
government involvement through regulations may be 
necessary. These regulations may actually drive the 
private operation of the firm back to the inefficiencies 
encountered under public ownership. The difference 
between public and private ownership may become 
indistinguishable.2
Another important aspect of privatization is that of 
managerial monitoring. Normally in a publicly run 
enterprise there is very little review of managerial 
performance. In such an environment public managers are 
able to pursue their own agendas which as previously 
mentioned can lead to inefficiency. Only when political 
sensitivity is spawned through lack of operating revenues 
and possible reduction of services, does managerial 
performance become an issue for political review.
Unlike public managers, private managers are faced
2 That is not, of course, to say that public ownership and 
regulated private ownership have identical consequences. One 
possible difference lies in the information available to government 
decision makers.(Schapiro and Willig, 1990)
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daily with capital market pressures.3 Their performance 
can be positively influenced through profit sharing and 
stock options. The better their performance the greater 
their financial rewards. Poor performance by managers 
and their company can lead to bankruptcy or possible take 
overs. The positive and negative rewards faced by 
private managers gives them the incentive to maximize 
their performance.
A key element to the success of privatization is 
maintaining market equilibrium through competition. 
"Pure competition involves - many sellers and buyers of 
a standardized product; free entrance, no collusion." 
(Reynolds, 1985) Economic efficiency is achieved in a 
market economy through allocative and production 
efficiency. This means that the correct amount of each 
good is produced at the lowest price possible. This 
concept can be seen in figure 2-1. (Next Page)
3 In economies where capital markets are underdeveloped, 
privatization may be used as an element of policy to promote their 
developments.(Vickers and Yarrow, 1991)
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FIGURE 2-1.





PRICE = MARGINAL COST (P=MC)
SOURCE: Reynolds, Loyd G. Micro Economics: Analysis and 
Policy. Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1985 Fig. 5-8, 
p.135
The satisfaction of a consumer purchasing the last 
unit produced in figure 2-1 equals the satisfaction 
derived from using their resources in the production of 
other goods. In this model P=MC, competition forces 
producers to maintain minimum returns. Only through 
increased operational efficiency can a producer hope to 
increase their profit. This is an important aspect of 
privatization and competition.
Privatization in a non-competitive market environment 
is subject to different economic conditions. In a 
monopolistic market there may be just one supplier of a 
good. If there are no substitutes for the product the
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producer is free to set pricing for the product. Based 
on the price set, the producer will be able to sell as 
many units possible, subject to the consumer demand curve 
for that product.
The economic model for a producer with market power 
can be seen in figure 2-2.
FIGURE 2-2






SOURCE: Reynolds, Loyd G. Micro Economics: Analysis and 
Policy. Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1985 Fig. 6-4, 
p. 152
It is important to note that the marginal revenue 
(MR) is not equal to price as it was under the pure 
competition model in figure 2-1. In figure 2-2 the 
producer will maximize profits where marginal costs 
equals marginal revenue (MC=MR) at point E. Any quantity 
sold to the left of Q will cause marginal revenue to be
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greater than marginal cost so that the company will 
produce more. Any quantity sold to the right of Q will 
cause marginal cost to be greater than marginal revenue 
so that the company will produce less.
At the quantity Q the company will charge price P. 
At quantity Q the average total cost is QB which includes 
the normal return on capital under pure competition. 
Unlike under pure competition the monopolist firm makes 
an economic profit of AB per unit or a total profit of 
ABCP. In a purely competitive market, when economic 
profits are made by one firm, additional firms will move 
into the industry. In a market power setting additional 
firms are restricted from the market due to technological 
or natural monopoly conditions. The more inelastic the 
demand for the product the stronger the monopoly is 
considered.
Firms whether in a competitive setting or in a 
monopoly, maximize their profits where marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost. In a monopoly setting a firm 
normally will maximize its economic profits unless 
pressured by regulatory activity. In a competitive 
market economic profits are short term. The analogy 
between competitive and non-competitive markets will be 




PUBLIC WORKS (WATER UTILITIES)
A better understanding of public works function is 
important if we are going to be able to discern 
privatization effects on public water utilities. A 
public water utility is just one of many different types 
of public works facilities that make up the 
infrastructure of our urban areas. These facilities 
range in activities from waste water and solid waste 
collection systems to highways and airports. For the 
benefit of our discussion public works can be defined as 
follows:
the physical structures and facilities that are 
developed and acquired by public agencies to house 
governmental functions and provide water, power, 
waste disposal, transportation, and similar services 
to facilitate the achievement of common social and 
economic objectives. (Stone, 1974)
The definition of public works above can be 
broadened as follows:
they provide the physical infrastructure (facilities 
and services) essential to urban society and 
economic and social development. They constitute 
the main fabric of what may be called urban physical 
systems linked to national and regional systems. 
Public works make human settlements and nations 
possible. (Stone, 1974)
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From these definitions it becomes apparent that 
public works facilities, which includes public water 
utilities are of immense importance to contemporary 
society. This fact is highlighted in that 1/3 to 1/2 of 
local government budgets are allocated to public works 
functions. (Cohn and Manning, 1974) The large percentage 
of local funds allocated to public works makes their 
potential privatization important. If privatization does 
increase the efficient allocation of their services, 
substantial cost savings could be realized.
Public water utilities like other public works 
activities function in a very interactive urban 
environment. "Fiscal crisis, labor relations, the 
working of the political process, the demands of new 
technology, .. . increased ecological and environmental 
concerns." (Korbitz, 1976) All these factors greatly 
influence how public utilities function both economically 
and socially. The dynamics of their environment 
complicate attempts at increasing their operational 




WATER UTILITIES AS NATURAL MONOPOLIES
Further review and definition of public water 
utilities leads us to the term "natural monopoly."1 An 
industry is usually said to be a natural monopoly if 
production can be conducted most efficiently by a single 
entity. According to Steve H. Hanke and Stephen J.K. 
Walters (1987), "the water supply industry is a straight 
forward illustration." They use the following example 
to illustrate their point:
The capacity of the pipes used to supply water is 
roughly proportional to its cross-sectional area. 
The associated cost is proportional to its 
circumference. If the cross section of the pipe is 
doubled, the circumference is less then doubled. 
This illustrates that while the value of water is 
doubled, the cost does not. Ultimately the average 
transmission costs decline. This idea is supported 
by the fact that adding more customers to a water 
system reduces the unit cost to everyone.
Field data collected by Hanke and Roland W. Wentworth 
strongly support this theory. (Hanke & Walters, 1987)
1 "Natural monopoly" and "public utility" are often used 
interchangeably. Kahn (1971) regarded the essence of natural 
monopolies as: "...their costs will be lower if they consist in a 
single supplier." and "...a natural monopoly is an industry in 
which the economies of scale - that is, the tendency for average 
costs to decrease the larger the producing firm - are continuous 
up to the point that one company supplies the entire demand."
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Further evidence of water utilities inherent nature 
to be a monopoly can be seen in a list of characteristics 
of monopolies as provided by Farner (1902) which still 
have significance today: (Berg & Tschirhart, 1988)
1. capital intensive (significant fixed costs)
2. viewed as necessity (essential to community)
3. non-storable (fluctuating demands)
4. produced in favored location
5. involves direct connection to customers
The characteristics outlined by Farner exemplify the 
water utility industry. Water utilities fixed costs are 
large due to the expansive infrastructure needed to (1) 
produce, (2) deliver and (3) store water for its customer 
base. Without question water is a necessity not only to 
individuals, but for communities. Water production has 
minimal storage capability and is burdened by seasonal 
high demands. The production of water is restricted to 
those areas where it can be pumped from the ground or 
from some type of surface water source. And lastly, 
providing water to customers on a large scale usually 
requires a direct connection to them.
Natural monopolies such as water utilities are
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subject to market price distortion, due to their inherent 
market power. These irregularities in the market pricing 
structure can take on a number of forms as outlined by 
Berg and Tschirhart (1988) in their book Natural Monopoly 
Regulation:
1. prices to "high" (reflecting monopoly power)
2. prices to "low" (predatory pricing)
3. prices high for some low for others 
(discrimination or subsidies)
4. prices unstable (difficult to maintain 
competitive pricing)
The potential for market price distortion due to the 
presence of a monopoly creates the need for some type of 
over sight to protect the product's market price. Water 
utilities are usually governed by direct government 
control or through government regulation. Regulatory 
boards or commissions attempt to control cost, price, 
profits and quality of services. "The board or 
commission through regulatory action attempts to produce 
economic results which would occur automatically under 
market competition: production at minimum cost, output 
determined by equality of price and marginal cost, and 
also a normal rate of return on capital." (Reynolds, 
1985) Unfortunately government control and/or regulation
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sometimes can cause their own market pricing problems. 





NATURE OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
Public works facilities, specifically public water 
utilities can be categorized by the type of good or 
service they provide. Water utilities provide a form of 
quasi public goods and services. Unlike pure public 
goods the services of a public water utility are able to 
be excluded from individuals not wishing to receive 
them. 1 Quasi public goods differ from private goods in 
that they can cause spillover effects or externalities. 
Reynolds (1985) indicates that, " ••• like a public good, 
quasi public goods have important elements of pUblic-
ness in its consumption •••• " From Reynolds definition 
it seems that quasi public goods are closer in character 
to public goods then to private goods. 
It is important to note that the nature of a good, 
that being, private, quasi public or public goods have 
an important influence on their potential provision 
through privatization. Pure public goods which are non-
rival in consumption and non-excludeable to potential 
consumers are usually provided by our government. 
1 Pure public goods are: 1. nonrivalness in consumption and 
2. nonexcludability from consumption. 
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Examples of these types of services are national defense, 
police protection and for the most part fire protection. 
Pure private goods on the other hand are goods demanded 
by customers, produced by private enterprise based on the 
demand, and sold at the market equilibrium price. The 
market equilibrium price is based on the supply and 
demand of the product being sold. 
Quasi public goods due to their nature may be 
provided by either government or by the private sector 
or some combination of both. This leads to an 
interesting choice 
government or the 
efficiently. 
when considering which provider, 




THE DEVELOPMENT OF WATER UTILITIES 
The early development of the water utility industry 
was predominantly undertaken by private enterprise. 
Centralized water systems were developed to provide fire 
protection and domestic water needs to its customers. 
The earliest system was constructed in Boston around 
1654. Similar systems were developed in Bethlehem, 
Pennsylvania, New York, and Philadelphia between 1762 
and 1830. The system in Philadelphia was the first 
successful municipal water supply constructed. Since 
1800 the tendency in development of water utilities has 
been towards public owner ship. (See Table 6-1.) 
TABLE 6-1. 
Percentage of public versus private water utilities 
YEAR PUBLIC WORKS PRIVATE WORKS TOTAL % PUBLIC 
1800 1 15 16 6.3 
1810 5 21 26 19.2 
1820 5 25 30 16.6 
1830 9 35 44 20.5 
1840 23 41 64 35.9 
1850 33 50 83 39.7 
1860 57 79 136 41.9 
SOURCE: Glaeser, Martin G. Public utilities in American 
Capitalism. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1957, Table 1 
p.27 
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As can be seen in Table 6-1. public ownership in 
water utilities increased from 6.3 percent in 1800 to 
41.9 percent in 1860. It seems that this swing in 
ownership was dictated by economic necessity. Increased 
water supply for fire protection and hygienic conditions 
necessitated using the power of eminent domain to obtain 
the necessary water rights. (Glaeser, 1957) Private 
enterprise was unwilling at this time to take on these 
social and economic commitments. 
Obtaining and providing ample water supply was 
essential to the growth of cities and ultimately 
increased property values within the community. This 
type of spirited competition for providing adequate 
utilities between competing communities lent itself to 
the advent of various financing and service provision 
alternatives. One such alternative was that of franchise 
grants and contracts which came to the forefront during 
the early part of the nineteenth century. Due to their 
importance in the development and provision of water 
utility services they will be reviewed in more detail 
later. 
Between 1860 and 1896 centralized water systems 
increased from 136 systems to 3,179 systems. Public 
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ownership also grew to 53 percent or 1,690 public water 
systems. Technological advances during the late 1800,s 
and early 1900, s were fueled by the development of 
electrical power and improved pumping equipment. 
with more extensive water systems and associated 
population growth came increased environmental pollution. 
The pollution was generated by a combination of 
inadequate facilities for handling sewage and the 
environmental impact of industrial wastes. Increasing 
death rates from typhoid fever were first noticed by 
health officials in the 1890's. (Glaeser, 1957) This 
growing problem was traced to water pollution. 
With the discovery of water pollution and its 
negative health effects came government intervention in 
the form of regulations governing the production of 
water. These regulations were an attempt to minimize or 
control the negative technological externalities incurred 
by improper water resource management. 1 Technological 
externalities arose from the use of scarce resources of 
which no particular individual or group had property 
rights over. The property rights issue forced the 
government to initiate some type of intervention process. 
1 Technological externalities - are external effects not 
transmitted through the price system. (Reynolds, 1985) 
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---. 
In this case the government regulations and subsequent 
impact on the economic provisions of the water utility 
industry will be reviewed in detail later. It is 
important to note that early on in the development of the 
water utility industry government intervention was 
necessitated by the large social problem created by water 
pollution. This would set the stage for the future 
development of the industry. 
The twentieth century was dominated by two main 
problems for the water industry. Both issues, scarcity 
of water and the quality of water would be open to 
intense scrutiny from the Federal government all the way 
down to local government. By 1945 the number of 
centralized water systems had grown to 15,400 of which 
approximately 80 percent were public systems. The only 
large system at this time that was exclusively supplied 
by private enterprise was in Indianapolis. Due to the 
ever increasing water demands of cities larger and larger 
quantities of water were needed and surface water 
supplies became the major water source. Because of 
surface waters susceptibility to contamination came 
increased pressure to assure high quality water free of 
pollution. 
To facilitate the needs of the growing communities 
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for water in the twentieth century, new governmental 
involvement developed. One such development was 
Metropolitan Water districts. In 1928 the Metropolitan 
Water District of Southern California was founded. Its 
function was to secure water rights for its members and 
provide to them at wholesale cost the water demands they 
needed. The members who purchased water at whole sale 
rates would in turn sell the water to their customers at 
retail prices. Metropolitan Water Districts allowed 
smaller communities without the resources to negotiate 
or obtain needed water rights to be part of a bigger 
group which had the resources to do so. Subsequently 
hundreds of metropolitan water districts have developed 
across the country. 
The water industry throughout its development has 
been faced with problems revolving around the issues of 
common resources and externalities. Because of these 
social problems the water industry has been pushed more 
into the web of government involvement either through 
actual ownership or by government regulation. This fact 
will greatly influence our findings with respect to the 
impact ownership and competition have on the efficient 




DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS 
The water industry has been subject to government 
laws and regulations for nearly 100 years. Its roots 
date back to the early 1890's when the Interstate 
Quarantine Act was enacted. The law empowered the us 
Public Health Service (USPHS) to help stop the spread of 
communicable diseases across state lines. 
The first federal drinking water standards were 
adopted in 1914. The USPHS through the us Treasury was 
responsible for assuring specific bacteriological quality 
of interstate water haulers. Soon afterwards many state 
and local governments adopted these standards for the 
water suppliers under their jurisdiction. 
In 1962 the standards were revised to cover 28 
constituents. (Pontius, 1993) The standards set limits 
on health related chemical and biological impurities. 
There were also standards set for aesthetic qualities 
such as appearance, taste and odor. AlISO states 
accepted these standards either as regulations or 
guidelines. (Oleckno, 1982) 
In 1969 the USPHS undertook a study called the 
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Community Water Supply Study (CWSS). The object of the 
study was to see if the US drinking water industry met 
the 1962 standards. It was found that 41 percent of the 
systems surveyed did not meet the guidelines. (Pontius, 
1993) Several million people were being provided with 
water of inadequate quality while 360,000 people were 
being supplied with potentially dangerous water. 
(Pontius, 1993) 
In 1974 the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(USEPA) was created as an independent office under the 
Executive Office of the President. They took over the 
review of the 1962 standards from the USPHS. Further 
studies conducted by the USEPA, the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) and others supported the findings of the 
CWSS. (Hawkins, 1975) Congressional interest in new 
federal safe drinking water legislation increased. In 
1974 the discovery of trihalomethanes in public water 
systems drew further attention to the need for additional 
federal legislation. (Bellar, 1974) 
In 1974 the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA PL 93-523) 
was signed into law. The SDWA set national primary 
drinking water regulations which applied to all public 
water systems. Interim regulations were adopted in 1975 
based on the 1962 USPHS standards. In 1977 revised 
25 
regulations were proposed based on a study of the health 
effects of contaminants done by the National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS). As can be seen in figure 7-1 only 23 
contaminants were regulated between 1974 and 1986. 
FIGURE 7-1. Promulgation of drinking water reg's. by 
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In 1986 further findings on organic contaminants and 
pathogens such as Giardia lamblica focused Congressional 
attention on the adequacy of the SDWA. Congress was 
particularly critical of the USEPA's rate of progress in 
regulating contaminants. In June of 1986 Amendment (PL 
99-339) was enacted. The amendment required the EPA to 
set standards on 83 contaminants according to specific 
deadlines. Even though most of the deadlines have not 




OBSTACLES TO PRIVATIZING 
WATER UTILITIES
The subsequent review of the water utility industry 
touched on specific areas of its development and 
structure which contributed to its present form, 
dominated by public ownership. According to Savas 
(1982), "the principle function of government is to 
provide services that by nature are monopolies," No one 
particular issue is more important then the fact that 
water utilities are considered "natural monopolies." 
Economies of scale as pointed out by Hanke and Walters 
(1987) dictate economical efficiency by only having one 
water supplier in a given area. Duplication of this 
service by other potential suppliers would be very 
inefficient due to the large capital costs needed for the 
infrastructure requirements.
Urban growth spawned the need for greater quantities 
of water. The large capital costs needed to expand the 
infrastructures to produce, distribute and store water 
were cost prohibitive to potential private investors. 
Realizing the importance of providing adequate public 
services caused governments to increase their 
involvement.
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The fact that most public water utilities are natural 
monopolies limits the prospects for privatization. "Due 
to incumbent firms large sunk costs, entry into the 
market is not possible. (Berg and Tschirhart, 1988) The 
chance for pure competition with many sellers of a 
standardized product is not possible. Privatization 
within the framework of monopolies would best be 
accomplished through some form of franchise bidding or 
contracting out of services. To maximize or increase 
operational efficiency the existing economies of scale 
within the monopoly would need to be utilized.
COMMON RESOURCES 
Another potential problem area in attempting to 
privatize water utilities is the fact that water is a 
common resource. It is not privately owned but can be 
shared by many potential users. One groups use of water 
may have harmful effects on the use by others creating 
negative externalities. For example, surface water may 
be viewed by one group as a recreational source, by 
another group as a necessity for their industrial 
processes and by another as their source of domestic 
water. Potential industrial pollution to the water could 
reduce the recreational and domestic uses of the water, 
creating a need for some type of intervention. More
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times then not, problems stemming from common resources 
lead to legal action and/or government intervention.
The competition for common resources is an everyday 
occurrence. Many issues over water rights end up in 
litigation and further government regulation. The 
potential for extended legal action limits potential 
private investors who do not wish the financial risk of 
such legal endeavors.
Recently the US Forest Service lost a court case in 
Colorado over water rights. In this case the US Forest 
Service wanted to reserve water right in Colorado to 
preserve natural stream beds. "Colorado water users - 
agricultural and municipal testified against the USFS 
claim, fearing a victory would threaten existing and 
future water supplies." (Water Works News, Mar-93) The 
US Forest Service spent upwards of $10 million in legal 
fees trying to prove their case, only to lose. The 
financial extent of the legal action taken in this 
example indicates the potential costs with which water 
purveyors could be faced.
As sources of water become more scarce the legal 
posturing for water rights will become increasingly 
critical. A further example of this can be seen in the
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sparing going on between Arizona and Nevada over the Law 
of the River - 1922 Colorado River Compact. Arizona's 
fear of future water shortages have them revisiting a 
compact signed by seven states 71 years ago. The 
potential for lengthy legal action and possible 
government intervention looms.
To achieve greater lobbying power states and local 
units seek to become part of a larger entity. States 
form compacts with other states jointly affected by 
common resource issues, while local units consolidate 
into Metropolitan districts to assure their long term 
interests in common resources such as water are 
protected. Meanwhile government involvement is on the 
increase. The joint use of common resources seems to be 
an issue that will undoubtedly continue to fall into the 
hands of government both through legal action and 
regulations.
EXTERNALITIES
As previously indicated joint consumption of common 
resources can cause externalities.1 Externalities can 
"...influence the well-being of nonconsenting parties; 
the nonconsenting parties may be either helped (by 
external benefits) or harmed by (external costs).
1 Externalities are effects of action by one producer or 
consumer on the costs or rewards of other producers or consumers. 
(Reynolds, 1987)
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(Gwartney and Stroup, 1983) An example of this in the 
water industry would be, "...monopoly rents which are 
partly used (implicitly or explicitly) to cross-subsidize 
high-cost consumers." (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991) In this 
example certain customers are actually paying higher 
water rates to the benefit of others who are receiving 
lower rates. Those subsidizing the cost of water are 
harmed by external costs, while those subsidized are 
receiving external befits. Pletzman (1989) feels that 
privatization will undermine this cross-subsidization, 
requiring taxing and/or subsidies to be established. 
Again more government involvement, when the attempt 
through privatization is to reduce the size of 
government.
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
As long as monopolies are present, common resource 
questions arise and externalities exist, some form of 
government intervention to regulate will be necessary. 
Since the water industry is faced with all three of these 
concerns it seems safe to assume that government 
involvement with the industry will be necessary 
regardless of the form of ownership (public or private).
Government regulation with respect to natural 
monopolies or public utility regulation dates back into
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the late 1800's. Growing concerns over the economic 
power of public utilities spurred review of, "this 
capital-intensive technology." (Berg and Tschirhart, 
1988) The goal of these early regulatory activities are 
summarized by Banbright (1961) as follows:
1. Simplicity and public acceptability
2. Freedom from controversy
3. Revenue sufficiency
4. Revenue stability
5. Stability of rates
6. Fairness in apportionment of total costs
7. Avoidance of undue rate discrimination
8. Encouragement of efficiency
It should be noted that most of these goals have 
components of efficiency. It should also be mentioned 
that balancing economic efficiency with political 
priorities adds considerable difficulty for natural 
monopoly control mechanisms: (Schmalensee, 1979)
In short, the political view of appropriate 
regulatory performance is an inherently unattainable 
ideal; effected interest group competition on all 
decisions and effective decision making are 
incompatible, In order to permit regulators to 
consider the whole spectrum of collective goals and 
to respond directly or indirectly to all interest 
group pressure, they must be given considerable 
freedom of action. But the relative lack of control 
that must accompany the delegation of broad
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authority increases the difficulty of ensuring that 
desirable trade-offs are made and make special 
interest action or inaction more likely. It is 
simply not possible, desirable though seems in 
principle, to use the control of natural monopoly 
effectively to pursue a number of potentially 
conflicting social goals.
If the true goal of natural monopoly regulation is 
lost in the conflicting political and social concerns, 
the end product which should be the efficient allocation 
of services is not met. Privatization introduced into 
a natural monopoly setting will be faced with these same 
political and social conflicts. Because of this it may 
not improve long term efficiency as originally thought.
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISPLACEMENT
Another area of concern and potential problems in 
privatization is the dislocation of public employees. 
Public employees maintain considerable political power. 
Because they are employed by government they normally 
support political candidates who will increase 
governmental programs. According to Savas (1982), 
"...public employees represent a sixth of the work force, 
cast more than a quarter of the votes." These numbers 
obviously represent a group of voters who can generate 
considerable influence in an election.
Public employee unions have strongly resisted local
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contracting out initiatives. Lobbying activities and 
lawsuits have blocked many attempts to implement 
privatization. Areas with strong employee unions have 
been quite successful in keeping privatization out.
A study conducted by Dudek and Company for the 
National Commission for Employment Policy (May, 1988) 
highlighted some other major areas of concern over public 
employee displacements
1. Percentage of public employees losing their jobs 
due to privatization - (5 to 10 percent of those 
displaced lost their jobs)
2. Amount of public assistance needed for those 
workers displaced. - (1.5 percent of the savings 
generated by contracting out)
3. Do private contractors pay lower wages? - 
(private contractors generally pay lower wages 
compared to those paid by government)
4. How do fringe benefits compare between private 
firms and government. - (generally government is 
more generous in their benefit packages, 
especially in retirement)
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5. Do private contractors use labor more 
efficiently? - (increased labor productivity is 
a key element of privatization for it to work 
effectively)
6. Privatization effect on minorities and women. - 
(no major harmful effects for either)
7. Overall employment effect - (nearly as many jobs
are created in the private sector as lost in
government)
Based on this study it seems that the net effect of 
privatization on employment are reduced wages, somewhat 
reduced benefits and increased productivity. Good for 
government but not quite so good for the public employee. 
It was also noted in the study that privatization would 
be more readily accepted by public employees if it were
done to provide new services, and only replace employees
through attrition, minimizing layoffs to current 
employees.
A 1987 study done by Touche Ross indicated that 47 
percent of local administrators stated that attempts to 
privatize were impeded due to local employee resistance.
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(Dudeck and Company, 1988) This clearly indicates that 
employee resistance to privatization can be a major 
factor as to its success or failure.
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IX.
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PRIVATIZATION 
FOR PUBLIC WATER UTILITIES
Franchise Contracts
Due to the economic environment of public water
utilities the alternatives for privatizing are somewhat 
limited. One form of privatization that has historically 
been used in public utilities is franchising.1
Franchises are most frequently employed by municipal 
governments for the provision and production of toll 
goods. (Stein, 1992) E.S. Savas (1982) in his book 
Privatizing the Public Sector indicates that, "many toll 
goods are natural monopolies, which is to say that as the 
number of users increases, the cost per user decreases." 
He further stated that, "Collective - action may be
required to assure that these monopolies are created and 
granted in the first place and then regulated so that the 
owners do not exploit their monopoly privileges
unfairly." Stein's and Savas's use of toll goods equates 
to what other writers such as Reynolds (1985) calls quasi 
public goods. They can be supplied in a market place but 
need collective action to control or regulate.
1 Franchising refers to the strategy of auctioning the right 
to provide a (natural) monopoly service. Franchising creates 
competition for the market when competition in the market is 
infeasible or undesirable. (Ramamurt and Vernon, 1991)
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Provision of toll goods such as water, gas and urban 
transit through franchise grants dates back to the early 
part of the nineteenth century. During this time non­
exclusive franchise rights for public services were 
granted through state legislation. Local units of 
government were not satisfied with the states' decisions 
on providers granted franchises in their areas. They 
felt they could make better decisions on granting 
franchises under state delegated authority. Authority 
was eventually conferred upon cities to establish 
franchise grants for public services.
Early franchises were expressly perpetual or lacking 
a definite time limit. (Glaeser, 1957) Due to this fact 
there was very little regulatory effect on the utilities 
by local units of government. In this type of setting 
competition failed to function because utilities would 
eventually consolidate into a single company. Because 
of the problem with perpetual franchises, new laws were 
passed to limit the lengths of franchises. The new short 
term franchises (10 to 60 years) were designed to prevent 
monopoly profits for public utilities.
As it turns out short term franchises were also a 
failure. Companies under existing franchise contracts 
held an advantage in negotiating contract renewals.
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Because of the uncertainty of short-term franchises 
companies were unwilling to extend infrastructures to new 
areas unless it was tied into a contract extension.
From the experience gained by cities with non­
exclusive perpetual and short-term franchise grants came 
a reorganization of thought. "Public utilities, whether 
in public or in private hands, are best conducted under 
a system of legalized and regulated natural monopoly." 
(Glasser, 1957) This new concept of exclusive franchise 
rights was still bothered by term limitations. Franchise 
contracts without provisions for municipal buy backs of 
property hindered expansion of utilities into needed 
areas. Investors tended to manipulate earnings to 
recapture their investments, meanwhile allowing the 
services to deteriorate.
Control of rates under franchise contracts was 
another problem between the local units of government and 
the contractors providing the services. Potential 
investors were reluctant to enter into agreements where 
there were considerable control over rates by cities. 
They preferred contracts where local units did not have 
the power to alter or repeal existing rates covered under 
the franchise agreement.
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The problems encountered with attempts to provide 
public utility services by franchise grants and the 
subsequent sentiment towards monopolies made public 
ownership and operation an alternative for delivery of 
public services. This move towards public ownership of 
utilities belies E.S. Savas's thoughts on, "the principle 
function of government is to provide services that by 
nature are monopolies." (Savas, 1982)
Contracting Out 
Contracting out is a competitive bidding process, 
which allows government to obtain services at the lowest 
possible cost. When government contracts out a service 
it retains funding responsibilities but hires a private 
firm to perform or deliver the services. This idea as 
a means of increasing efficiency is echoed in comments 
made by the Committee for Economic Development, "the 
public sector seems likely to function best as a market 
creator, systems manager, and contractor of social tasks 
rather than as an actual operator of every kind of public 
service." (Donahue, 1989) In more general terms, 
government should not be obligated to provide services, 
but see that they are provided. This type of thinking 
representative of the ideas behind contracting out public 
services.
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A 1985 study by the National Center for Policy 
Analysis bluntly declared, "city government can cut half 
the cost of city services by contracting with private 
firms." (Donahue, 1989) Further rationale was listed 
as follows:
Private ownership allows the concentration of 
interest in efficiency; public ownership does not. 
Public management is constrained by layered 
authority, mandatory reviews, civil service rules, 
formal bid procedures, and so on; private management 
is not. Public organizations usually are secure 
against competition, provide organizations 
frequently are not. Private firms that fail to 
deliver face bankruptcy; public agencies that fail 
to deliver do not.
As good as privatization (contracting out) sounds, 
it is not without its potential problems. Problems that 
could undermine the increase efficiency that contracting 
out is propertied to achieve.
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH CONTRACTING OUT:
1. Low balling contracts only to have contractor 
come back at later date to raise prices.
2. Reduction in the quality of services provided.
3. Corruption caused by payoffs, bid rigging, 
price fixing and kick backs.
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4. Ensuring services to the poor.
Various activities in the water industry could be 
provided by contracting out. By doing so government 
would be assuring the service is provided without having 
to provide it. In conjunction with contracting out, the 
industry would have to maintain its overall goals and 
objectives:
To provide an adequate supply of water that is free 
of health hazards, aesthetically acceptable, and a 
adequate quality for household, commercial, and 
industrial use. To provide prompt, courteous, 
reliable service and to minimize injuries and damage 
associated with the system. (Hatry, Blair. Fisk, 
Greiner, Hall Jr., and Schaenman, 1977)
Through the process of supplying water, (1) water 
intake, (2) water purification, (3) water storage and (4) 
water distribution, water utilities engage in a wide 
range of activities on a routine basis. The activities 
range from capital-intensive activities such as pumping 
operations to more labor-intensive areas such as meter 
reading and customer service.(Hatry, Clarren, Houten, 
Woodward, and DonVito, 1979) It is the labor-intensive 
activities that are best suited to be enhanced by 
contracting out. This is obviously a factor of lower 
labor costs and greater productivity in the private
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sector.
Since water utilities can be a mix of capital- 
intensive and labor intensive activities at the 
operational level, such as, water intake operations, it 
would be easier to implement contracting out at the 
individual service level. For example contracting out 
the entire water intake operation (pumping of water to 
or from wells, rivers reservoirs, water towers and 
treatment plants) would prove difficult because of the 
capital intensive nature of the equipment involved, while 
individual services such as electrical repair and 
maintenance would be much easier to implement and more 
efficient.
Any moves towards enhancing efficiency through 
contracting out should also consider the quality of the 
service. Increased efficiency accompanied by decreases 
in the quality of the service makes contracting out less 




PRIVATIZATION IN THE WATER INDUSTRY
In an article written by Steve K. Hanke and Stephen 
J.K. Walters, Privatizing Waterworks (1987), they discuss 
franchise contracts within the realm of Chadwickian 
theory. The basic premise of Chadwick's theory is that 
franchise contracts should be bid on the charges for 
services to be offered and not a lump sum bid for the 
franchise rights. Chadwick concluded the later would 
cause water monopolies to continue to produce and 
overcharge for its services.
Franchise contracts for the provision of exclusive 
water rights have been used in France since 1782. The 
franchise contracts have taken on two basic forms. 
"Concession contracts", in which the private firm is 
responsible for construction and operation of the 
facilities. The other form is "affermage contracts" in 
which the facilities are constructed publicly and are 
operated by private firms.
Hanke and Walter (1987) conclude from their review 
that both theory and evidence strongly support the notion 
that private provision of water services is more 
efficient than governmental supply. A study conducted
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by w. Mark Crain and Asghar Zarkoohi (1978) supports 
Hanke's and Walters position. Crain and Zarkoohi found 
operating costs to be 25 percent higher in public water 
utilities then in private water utilities. Crain and 
Zardkoohi attribute their findings to lower production 
and under-utilization of capital by government.
In the U.S., the American Water Works Association 
periodically publishes comparative data on cost, returns 
and other financial information relevant to public and 
private water utility operations. One of the problems 
with analyzing the data are the organizational 
ambiguities between different water suppliers. 
Organizations may vary in, "size and dispersion of 
population served; in the scale and age of their capital 
equipment; in the costs paid for labor, machinery, water, 
energy, and finance; in the quality of available water 
supplies; and in how much they treat the water before 
pumping to its customers." (Donahue, 1989) Systematic 
differences between public and private water suppliers 
might lead to misleading results if compared.
In light of these potential problem areas in 
comparing public and private water utilities, seven 
studies have been conducted to review comparative cost 
effectiveness. To compensate for the systematic
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differences, models have been developed to compensate for 
the factors mentioned previously. The results of the 
comparisons can be seen in Table 10-1.
Table 10-1
Water Utility Cost Studies: A Summary
Study Conclusion
Man and Mikesell, 1976 
Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978 
Bruggink, 1982 
Feigenbaum and Teeples, 1983 
Feigenbaum, Teeples and 
Glyer, 1986 
Byrners, Grosskopf and 
Hayes, 1986
Teeples and Glyer, 1987
Public more efficient 
Private more efficient 
Public more efficient 




SOURCE: Donahue John D. The Privatization Decision. New 
York: Basic Book, Inc., 1989, Table 4.3 p.75
It is important to note that each subsequent study 
attempted to further refine problem areas that were 
encountered in the studies done previously. As can be 
seen in table 10-1, the evidence indicates that there is 
no tendency for private water utilities to be more 
productive. The results are quite persuasive, despite
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presumptively superior incentives of the profit-seeking 
form of organization, private water utilities, on 
average, are no cheaper then public ones." (Donahue, 
1989)
Even though private firms are potentially superior 
for efficient production, their potential may not work 
under certain circumstances.1 In this case, "public 
versus private matters, but competitive versus non­
competitive usually matters more. (Primeaux, 1977) It 
is important to note that the varied findings on the 
seven studies conducted are indicative of the 
difficulties encountered when analyzing economic data 
retrieved from a natural monopoly setting. Due to this 
fact very few studies have been done on water utilities 
with respect to operational efficiency.
Even though comparative data are not available for 
contracting out individual service levels in the water 
industry, the potential should be comparable to the 
findings in other privatized public service areas. 
Individual service levels that are labor intensive should 
be a prime area for comparison.
1 Walter Primeaux (1977) concludes, "private monopolies 
develop the same kind of organizational slack that plaques public 
agencies, and regulation cannot really substitute for competition.
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A study conducted by Barbara J. Stevens for the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development found that 
municipal agencies are 50 percent less efficient than 
private contractors. (Donahue, 1989) A summary of 
Stevens findings can be found in Table 10-2.
TABLE 10-2
ESTIMATED GAINS FROM PRIVATIZATION
Function Extra cost of municipal
services over the cost of 
contractor services (by %)
Asphalt overlay construction 96
Janitorial services 93






SOURCE: Donahue, John D. The Privatization Decision. New 
York: Basic Book, Inc., 1989, Table 7.2 p.139
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As can be seen in Table 10-2 each activity other than 
payroll preparation cost more to be provided by public 
means. The water utility industry has many individual 
serves that could be potentially contracted out. Some 
of these activities are listed below:
WATER SUPPLY ACTIVITIES




5. Fire Hydrant Services
6. Valve Services
7. Pressure Survey
Testing of water samples 
to ensure the meeting of 
water quality standards.
Activities associated with 
constructing, inspecting 
and maintaining water 
mains.
Activities involved in 
repairing breaks or leaks 
in water mains or other 
aspects of the storage and 
distribution system.
Activities associated with 
installing adjusting or 
repairing, or replacing 
water meter or boxes.
Activities associated with 
installing, reinspecting 
and maintaining fire 
hydrants.
Activities associated with 
inspecting and maintaining 
valves and valve boxes.
Surveys of distribution 
system operations to check 
for leaks, breaks, 
obstructions, etc.
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8. Billing and Collection Billing of customers for
water use and collection 
of unpaid accounts.
Hatry, Hary P., Clarren, Sumner M., Houten, Therese von, 
Woodward, June D. and DonVito, Pasqual A. Efficiency 
Measurement for Local Government Services. Washington 
D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1979
Many water industry activities are presently being 
contracted out: engineering services, meter
installations, servicing and reading, distribution system 
installation and repairs, and utility billing and 
collections, just to name a few. Private contractors are 
providing to public water utilities the necessary labor 
and technical expertise needed to perform these 
activities. Even though comparative data are
unavailable, one could surmise based on the success of 
contracting out in other public service areas as 
indicated by Steven's study, cost savings are being 




Research on privatization in the water utility 
industry has been very limited. There are a number of 
reasons for this, "including the expense and trouble 
involved in large-scale field studies, the methological 
difficulty of isolating the effect of organizational form 
from a host of other determinants of cost or quality, 
demonstrated readiness of both advocates and opponents 
of privatization to make claims and make policy without 
waiting for empirical validation, and, perhaps, the 
issue's general lack of glamour...." (Donahue, 1989) 
Even so, there is enough information to make some 
specific conclusions on privatization with respect to 
public water utilities.
Rather then ask if the water industry can be 
privatized, the more important question is, how can it 
be made more competitive? Competition is not an 
automatic result of privatization, especially in an 
industry that is considered to be a "natural monopoly." 
By economic necessity the economies of scale that exist 
in public utilities need to be maintained to keep pricing 
at an optimal level. As in the water industry, this 
usually means a single supplier will be utilized to
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provide services.
Earlier, two forms of privatization were discussed, 
one being franchise agreements. Franchise contracts 
arguably are structured to promote competition in the 
water industry which is considered a natural monopoly. 
According to Steve H. Hanke and Stephen J.K. Walters 
(1987) franchising should generate substantial benefits 
for water customers:
Both theory and evidence strongly support the notion 
that private supply is more efficient than 
governmental supply. Waterworks, however, are true 
national monopolies; consequently, many argue 
against privatizing them. As they see it, 
privatization would simple transform a public 
monopoly into a private monopoly. But that need 
not be the case. The benefits of large-scale, 
single firm operations can be secured at competitive 
prices. This can be accomplished by employing 
Chadwick's system of franchise bidding in which the 
rights to a franchise are awarded to the firm that 
offers the best terms to the public.
Unfortunately, the preponderance of historical 
information on franchising and public utilities does not 
bear this out. Glaeser (1957) points out the following 
problems encountered with franchise contracts:
1. ...competition failed to function because
consolidation were the ultimate outcome.
2. ...substantial earnings began early and
developed into monopoly profits.
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3. ... existing companies had an advantage in 
negotiating for renewals.
4. ...uncertain tenure often created a situation 
which made refinancing difficult if not 
impossible.
5. ...companies were unwilling to build needed 
extensions unless suitable arrangements could 
be made to insure a continuance of their right 
to operate and thus enable them to secure the 
necessary capital.
6. An ever greater evil that crept into the 
administration of these enterprises as a result 
of the effectiveness of control under the 
special franchise was that of discrimination 
in both the service and rate.
Glaeser's findings on franchise contracts hardly 
supports Hanke's and Walters theory on private supply 
efficiency. Under franchise agreements he found 
sustaining competition to be very difficult, rates long 
term developed into monopoly profits and services were 
negatively impacted. Donahue (1989) echoes similar 
concerns as follows: "In the complex relationships among 
utility managers, investors, regulators, and consumers, 
contractual structures that give the right signals and 
incentives are difficult, and sometimes impossible, to 
fashion." The economic , political and social complexity 
of public water utilities makes efficiency enhancement 
through private franchise contracts questionable at best. 
The limited number of studies done on public water 
utilities show neither the public nor private provision 
of services to be superior. Social acceptance of public
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employee displacement due to franchise agreements further 
add to the difficulty of its successful implementation.
Selective privatization as earlier indicated in 
Steven's study could reduce the cost of government 
services by as much as 50 percent. This would allow 
public officials to concentrate their energies on tasks 
that could not be delegated. Private contracting not 
only provides cheaper labor and more productivity, but 
can provide the specialized needs that are impossible for 
most utilities to staff. Many utilities contract out 
specialized engineering functions (architectural, civil 
design and environmental), large project administration 
and construction, laboratory testing and many other 
functions. These contractual services are not practical 
for most utilities to maintain because of their technical 
requirements and cyclical demand.
Contracting out is not without its potential 
problems. Public employee displacement is an important 
aspect of selective privatization in public water 
utilities. "Even if taxpayers' stake in efficiency take 
precedence over workers, claims to their jobs, taking 
steps to cushion privatization shock to municipal workers 
- while it will likely cut savings considerably - is both 
politically prudent and commendably humane. (Donahue,
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1989)
Corruption is another area of concern when 
considering contracting out. If present, corruption 
and/or collusion can dramatically reduce or negate the 
effectiveness of contract services. Carefully structured 
competition for private firms through concise contract 
specifications will help reduce this potential problem.
When considering selective contracting out it is 
important to privatize the right services. This can only 
be done if the municipal officials overseeing the water 
utility have the necessary information to make correct 
decisions. In Section X of this paper, Table 10-2, it 
can be seen that payroll preparation has no costs 
advantages under private provision. Yet, Steven's 
reports that more cities contract out payroll services 
than street cleaning which affords a 43 percent savings 
though private provision. Obviously selecting the 
correct service to contract out is key for privatization 
to work most efficiently.
Public water utilities operate in a very complex 
economic, political and social environment. Continuing 
pressure is placed on the industry by government 
regulations. These regulations attempt to safeguard
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consumers by controlling natural monopoly pricing, 
assuring adequate water quality, rationing common 
resources and addressing problems created by
externalities. Customers demand the highest quality 
water at the lowest possible price. Couple these issues 
with the fact that in theory, the water industry being 
a natural monopoly functions most efficiently in a single 
supplier environment, will preclude a large divestiture 
of government involvement with the water industry.
Increase cost efficiency in the water industry seems 
to be most obtainable through selective contracting out 
of service level activities. To achieve this public
employee unions must become active partners in the 
privatization process. Joint cooperation between the 
public and private sector will be key for successfully 
contracting out services.
Those advocating privatization should not say that 
the public sector is bad and the private sector is
good, or that we need to dismantle the state or do
away with the public sector. In fact, if 
privatization is to succeed, we need a very strong, 
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